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APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF NUREMBERG 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
PHILIPPE KIRSCH∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Chancellor,  
Sen. Dodd, 
Mr. Mayor, 
Mr. Harris, 
Honoured Guests, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I would like to thank the Whitney Harris Institute and Washington 
University for the opportunity to speak to you this evening. 
This weekend we are marking the 60th anniversary of the judgment of 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. This Tribunal was 
followed by a series of trials carried out by the Allied powers in post-war 
Germany. We are here because the Nuremberg trials constituted a historic 
moment in the development of international law. They were important in 
their own right as a response to the atrocities of the Second World War. At 
the same time, they gave rise to a new system of international criminal 
justice. This system includes national courts, ad hoc international and 
mixed tribunals, and now the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). All of 
these institutions are rooted in Nuremberg. 
I would not presume to lecture you tonight on Nuremberg. Many of 
you are experts on the Nuremberg trials, and several of you—Whitney 
Harris, Ben Ferencz, and Henry King—were key participants. I will 
instead offer some thoughts from the perspective of someone who is 
involved in a similar endeavour at the ICC. 
In my remarks this evening, I intend to speak about the meaning of the 
Nuremberg trials, their legacy, how that legacy has been embodied in the 
ICC, and what the ICC is doing today.  
II. THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 
I will start with a few words on the Nuremberg trials themselves. 
Previous war crimes trials by national courts focused on minor defendants 
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for isolated and well-established violations of the law of war. At 
Nuremberg, not only military leaders, but also high-level officials and 
even private citizens faced trial for some of the most serious crimes known 
to humanity. We all owe a great deal to those who made the Nuremberg 
trials happen, including Robert Jackson, Thomas Dodd, Whitney Harris, 
Ben Ferencz and Henry King. 
The Nuremberg trials rested on two fundamental principles. First, 
individuals can and should be held accountable for the most serious 
international crimes. The judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal famously 
declared, “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”1 Ensuring 
accountability is important in itself, but it is also important because 
allowing impunity for widespread or systematic atrocities can have serious 
consequences for international peace.  
The second principle is that individuals should only be punished 
through a fair trial which safeguards the rights of the accused. Here of 
course, we are reminded of Robert Jackson’s statement to the Tribunal: 
“We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants 
today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these 
defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.”2 
Although the Nuremberg trials also declared many other important 
principles of procedural and substantive law, it is these two fundamental 
ideas, accountability and fair trials, which were at the core of Nuremberg’s 
meaning. These two ideas subsequently became the basis for the legacy of 
Nuremberg trials. 
III. THE LEGACY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 
I would like to turn now to the legacy of the Nuremberg trials. If the 
message of Nuremberg is that those committing international crimes 
should be punished, then it is logical that a court (or several courts) should 
exist to punish these crimes. And these courts must rigorously uphold the 
standards of fairness and due process. 
The Nuremberg trials were never intended to be mere historical events. 
Those who participated in them saw them as the beginning of a new era of 
 
 
 1.  “International Criminal Law,” Encyclopedia Britannica (2007), available at http://www. 
britannica.com/eb/article-24853. 
 2. Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement Before the International Military Tribunal, 
http://roberthjackson.org/man/theman2-7-8-1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
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accountability. For example, shortly after the Nuremberg Tribunal 
concluded, John Parker, one of the Tribunal’s alternate Judges, said, “It is 
not too much to hope that what we have done may have laid the 
foundation for the building of a permanent court with a code defining 
crimes of an international character and providing for their punishment.”3  
Ideally, all crimes would be prosecuted by domestic courts. Ordinarily, 
this is what happens. However, in exceptional circumstances, in the face of 
the worst atrocities, national courts have been either unwilling or unable to 
act. This may be because agents of the state direct or are complicit in the 
crimes as was the case in Nazi Germany. Or, as in other situations, conflict 
can lead to the collapse of government institutions, including the judiciary. 
In these situations an international court is needed to punish serious 
crimes. 
For nearly fifty years, the Cold War prevented the establishment of any 
international criminal court. During this time, serious crimes were 
committed around the world and went unpunished. The Nuremberg legacy 
was unfulfilled. 
The situation changed when the Cold War ended in 1989. International 
criminal justice once again became a realistic possibility. The United 
Nations established ad hoc tribunals in response to atrocities, first in the 
Former Yugoslavia and later in Rwanda. These tribunals are descendants 
of the Nuremberg trials. They again showed that international criminal 
justice is possible. However, they only partially fulfilled the legacy of 
Nuremberg. This is because ad hoc tribunals face several limitations: first, 
they have only covered a particular country or geographical region. 
Crimes that occur elsewhere cannot be punished by these tribunals. 
Second, these tribunals respond primarily to past events. They are by and 
large not designed to address future crimes. Third, their creation depends 
on the political will of the international community of the day. As a result, 
such tribunals have been the exception, not the rule. These limitations also 
diminish the deterrent effect of ad hoc tribunals. 
A permanent, truly international criminal court is necessary for the 
punishment of international crimes. Equally important, only a permanent 
and readily available court can most effectively deter future crimes.  
 
 
 3. John J. Parker, The Nuremberg Trial, 30 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 109–15 (1946–47). 
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
I would like to turn now to the International Criminal Court and how it 
is intended to fill this need. The ICC was established through a treaty 
negotiated in 1998 by 160 states meeting in Rome. It builds on the two 
core principles of Nuremberg: the need for accountability for serious 
crimes and the importance of fair trials. 
Like Nuremberg, the ICC is intended to hold individuals accountable 
for the most serious international crimes. The Nuremberg Tribunal had 
jurisdiction over both crimes against humanity and war crimes. The ICC 
also has jurisdiction over these crimes. Additionally, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal had jurisdiction over crimes against peace, which are referred to 
as crimes of aggression in the ICC Statute.  
The states which negotiated the ICC Statute could not agree on a 
definition of aggression or conditions for the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction. They considered that the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction 
over a crime if it could not be precisely defined. In addition, they did not 
agree on how the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction should relate to the United 
Nations Security Council’s role in finding that a state has committed 
aggression. Nonetheless, the legacy of Nuremberg was so strong that most 
states insisted it be included in the Statute. However, the ICC will only 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once it is defined and 
conditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction are agreed. 
The ICC Statute builds considerably on the initial crimes tried at 
Nuremberg in two ways. First, the definitions in the ICC Statute and in the 
supplementary Elements of Crimes are far more detailed than those in the 
Nuremberg Charter and the statutes of recent ad hoc tribunals.  
Second, the ICC Statute reflects well-established developments in 
international law since Nuremberg. I would highlight two such provisions. 
The most obvious example is that the ICC has jurisdiction over a fourth 
offense: the crime of genocide. At the time of Nuremberg, the crime of 
genocide did not exist as such. Since the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention in 1948, this crime has become established in customary 
international law. Another example is the specific inclusion of crimes of 
sexual violence, such as rape, when committed as a war crime or as a 
crime against humanity. 
The ICC’s ability to ensure accountability is reflected in a number of 
other provisions rooted in Nuremberg. I would highlight two such 
provisions. First, at Nuremberg, an individual’s position as a Government 
official could not absolve him of responsibility. Second, Nuremberg made 
clear that acting under superior orders was not a defense for the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/4
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commission of atrocities. These principles are embodied in the ICC 
Statute, even more precisely. Those who commit crimes will be held 
accountable regardless of their status or their orders. 
We must remember that Nuremberg came about, in part, because of the 
German judicial system’s failure to provide accountability for serious 
crimes under the Third Reich. In fact, in one of the Nuremberg trials 
carried out by the U.S. Military Tribunal, United States v. Altstoetter, the 
court convicted several high officials for using the judicial system to 
commit Nazi crimes. Nuremberg was a court of last resort.  
The ICC is also a court of last resort. In the case of the ICC this is 
reflected in the principle of complementarity. Under this principle, the 
Court does not intervene if a domestic system is carrying out its 
responsibilities. A case is not admissible if it is being or has been 
investigated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction. The ICC will act 
only if a state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out an 
investigation or prosecution.  
I would like to turn now to the other fundamental principle shared by 
both Nuremberg and the ICC—the importance of fair trials. Both the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the ICC incorporated elements taken from 
different countries’ legal systems. This is an inevitable part of establishing 
an international tribunal that can be agreed to by several states. In 
evaluating a court like the ICC or the Nuremberg Tribunal, we cannot 
expect it to exactly mirror our national experience. What we should expect 
is that it guarantees due process and a fair trial, which can be and is done 
in different ways in different countries. Understanding this point can be a 
challenge for lawyers. In the context of setting up the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, Robert Jackson observed, “Members of the legal profession 
acquire a rather emotional attachment to forms and customs to which they 
are accustomed and frequently entertain a passionate conviction that no 
unfamiliar procedure can be morally right.”4 
I will not, tonight, provide a detailed recitation of the procedural law of 
the ICC, but many of its features are familiar to Americans. I cannot 
comment on how well the ICC compares to any one country’s system of 
criminal procedure. However, as you may find it of interest, I would refer 
you to a memorandum submitted to the U.S. Congress by nine former 
Presidents of the American Society of International Law. They wrote that 
the due process protections of the ICC Statute are, “at least as 
 
 
 4. Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials 
(Dec. 29, 1947), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jackson/preface.htm (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2007).  
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comprehensive as the American Bill of Rights—in certain cases even 
more detailed and specific.”5 
The ICC builds upon Nuremberg to ensure the fundamental fairness 
and impartiality of the Court. Yet, with all the positive comments that 
have been made about Nuremberg, two related caveats have often been 
voiced. These have been addressed in the ICC. 
The first caveat is that the Tribunal was set up after the fact to deal 
with crimes that had never before been punished under international law. 
The ICC cannot act in an ex post facto manner. It can only punish crimes 
committed after the Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. Moreover, 
the crimes which the ICC may try are defined in detail in the Statute and 
the Elements of Crimes. Potential perpetrators are now on notice that their 
actions may be tried before the ICC. 
The second caveat is that the Tribunal was a form of victor’s justice. 
The Charter establishing the Statute was adopted by the four Allied 
powers and had jurisdiction over members of the European Axis, 
specifically Nazi Germany. Those involved in the Tribunal acknowledged 
the challenges posed by this criticism and did their utmost to mitigate it.  
The ICC cannot be seen as victors’ justice. The ICC was freely 
established by states for themselves through an international treaty. All 
states could participate in the negotiation of the Statute, and the vast 
majority did so. A similar approach was applied to the drafting of the 
ICC’s subsidiary texts, specifically the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
and the Elements of Crimes. In negotiating the Statute and subsidiary texts, 
states sought wide agreement on establishing a fair and impartial Court. 
The result has been a Court with broad support. One hundred thirty-nine 
states signed the Statute before the deadline for signature expired at the 
end of 2000, expressing their intention to ratify the Statute. Today, 102 
countries around the world have ratified the Statute.  
Because the ICC Statute is a treaty, states are free to join or not to join 
the ICC as they see fit. In deciding to join the ICC, states permit the Court 
to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals or territory. This is an 
important point. The ICC is not a court of universal jurisdiction. Its 
jurisdiction is limited to the territories and nationals of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute or states otherwise accepting its jurisdiction. The ICC is not 
imposed on states. States must affirmatively accept its jurisdiction. The 
only exception is when the United Nations Security Council refers a case 
 
 
 5. Letter from Monroe Leigh, Partner, Steptoe v. Johnson, to Henry Hyde, Chairman of the H. 
Comm. on Int’l Relations (Feb. 21, 2001).  
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to the Court in the exercise of its recognized responsibilities to maintain 
and restore international peace and security. This decision requires the 
concurrence of all five permanent members of the Security Council. 
It was suggested in the course of the conference that these 
jurisdictional provisions limit the capacity of the Court to act. That is an 
accurate observation. The reason for these limitations was the necessity, at 
the Rome Conference, of ensuring that the newly created ICC would 
derive its strength from two competing but necessary sources: the strength 
of its provisions and the strength of the support it could muster. States 
needed to avoid creating either a Court that would enjoy general support 
but would be too weak to be effective, or a Court that would be strong on 
paper but would lack the support needed to be viable.  
V. THE COURT TODAY 
I would like to turn now briefly to the Court today—how it is 
implementing the Nuremberg legacy in practice. 
Three States Parties to the Rome Statute—Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic—have referred 
situations occurring on their territories to the Court. In addition, the 
Security Council has referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, a state not 
party to the Rome Statute. The Prosecutor is conducting investigations in 
three situations—Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 
Darfur.  
In 2005, the Court issued its first warrants of arrest in the situation in 
Uganda. The warrants were for five alleged members of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, including its leader, Joseph Kony. The crimes against 
humanity and war crimes alleged in the warrants include sexual 
enslavement, rape, intentionally attacking civilians, and forced enlistment 
of child soldiers. None of the five have yet been arrested. The Court does 
not have its own police force. It is the responsibility of states and 
international or regional organizations to arrest and surrender these 
persons to the Court.  
Earlier this year, Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a national of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, was surrendered to the Court, pursuant 
to an arrest warrant. He is alleged to have committed war crimes, namely, 
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and using them 
to participate actively in hostilities. A hearing will be held to confirm these 
charges before trial. If the charges are confirmed, the trial will begin. 
In addition to the legal differences I mentioned earlier, there is another 
important difference between Nuremberg and the ICC. The ICC operates 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in a very different environment than the Nuremberg Tribunal. By the time 
the Nuremberg Tribunal was formed, the war was over. The defendants 
were already in custody, where some of them have been for several years. 
The occupying armies had taken control and had ready access to 
documents. As Henry King said, the Nuremberg trials were conducted 
under ideal conditions. 
The ICC, on the other hand, is active in situations of ongoing conflict 
where crimes continue to be committed. These circumstances do not make 
the role of the Court any less important. Indeed, the deterrent value of the 
Court may be greater in the short term as a result. However, operating in 
these circumstances presents enormous security challenges relating to the 
protection of the Court’s staff, victims and witnesses.  
In addition, the ICC faces significant logistical challenges that were 
unknown at Nuremberg. The situations before the Court are spread across 
very different countries that often have poorly developed infrastructures in 
the areas under investigation. Each situation involves multiple local and 
regional languages.  
One of the biggest differences to Nuremberg is that the Court does not 
have its own police force, much less an army. As Ben Ferencz said, all 
societies need laws, courts and enforcement. For the ICC, enforcement 
capabilities are in the hands of states, not the Court. The cooperation of 
states is, therefore, absolutely crucial in obtaining the arrest and surrender 
of persons wanted by the Court. Cooperation is also essential in other 
areas, such as in providing evidence, relocating witnesses, and enforcing 
the Court’s sentences. The main challenge to the success of the Court will 
be ensuring sufficient cooperation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the differences I have mentioned, I have emphasised how the 
International Criminal Court is the continuation of the Nuremberg trials. It 
took nearly fifty years for the Nuremberg participants’ vision of a 
permanent successor to their efforts to be established. Now, we have that 
permanent court. The establishment of the ICC is the natural continuation 
of Nuremberg’s legacy. 
However, there is still much work to do. Whitney Harris made this 
point in the context of the adoption of the ICC Statute in Rome. He wrote, 
“Seven hundred years may pass before mankind is able to eliminate war in 
the world and establish a system of universal justice. Rome was the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/4
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beginning, the end may never come. For like Rome itself, the struggle for 
peace, law and justice in the world is eternal.”6  
The ICC is not, and can not be, a panacea. It alone cannot end impunity 
or deter crimes. Doing so will require international cooperation with and 
support for the Court. It will also require national efforts to investigate and 
prosecute crimes. We must not forget that punishing crimes is primarily a 
national responsibility. The ICC is only a Court of last resort to redress the 
gravest crimes.  
Nuremberg is our collective heritage. Fulfilling its legacy is our 
collective responsibility. In this conference we heard mention of the 
problems and challenges facing the ICC. It is important to address such 
issues, but it is also important not to focus so much on immediate issues as 
to forget that we have a Court that is permanent in nature and that is only 
three years-old. There will be easier and harder periods for the ICC. We 
must always keep in mind that the fundamental reasons why it was created 
are as relevant as ever and that we share a collective responsibility to 
ensure the Court’s success. 
The world has come too far, and the consequences of failure are too 
great. We must continue to carry forth the Nuremberg legacy and make an 
effective, permanent international court a lasting reality.  
Thank you. 
 
 
 6. Whitney R. Harris, A World of Peace and Justice Under the Rule of Law: From Nuremberg 
to the International Criminal Court (Whitney R. Harris Inst. for Global Legal Studies, Occassional 
Paper 2002-No. 1), reprinted in 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 689 (2007).  
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